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1

STATEMENT OF FACTS

:;:
This appeal is taken by the plaintiffs and appellants,
__., James S. Devine, Mrs. James S. Devine and Janet Gusinda,
__. from a judgment and jury verdict entered against them
and in favor of the defendants, Helen Cook and W. S.
Hatch Co., Inc. in an action tried in the Second Judicial
~~, District Court in and for Davis County, State of Utah.
The appellants' brief contains a Statement of Facts and
we will set forth herein those facts with which this de-

/
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fendant and respondent, W. S. Hatch Co., Inc. agrees,
the facts with which this defendant takes issue, and other
facts not referred to by plaintiffs in their brief.
It is agreed that the action arose out of an automobile accident in which the automobile owned and driven
by the plaintiff, James S. Devine, collided with an automobile driven by the defendant, Helen Cook; that the collision occurred at the intersection of 1500 South State
Street, Bountiful, Utah, and U. S. Highway 91 (Tr. s,
6) ; that plaintiffs were all proceeding north in the Devine
automobile on U. S. Highway 91 and that the defendant,
Helen Cook, had been proceeding east on 1500: South
Street and had come to a stop at the stop sign where 1500
South Street intersects with U. S. Highway 91, which is a
through highway; that two tank outfits owned by this
defendant, W. S. Hatch Co., Inc., a tank truck and fourwheeled tank trailer, and a tractor pulling a semi-trailer
carrying a tank, had also been proceeding north on U.S.
Highway 91 and had slowed down in preparation of turning left to go west on 1500 South Street, and that the
truck and four-wheeled trailer operated by Herschel Metcalf had come to a stop in preparation of turning left
(Tr. 7, 15, 16) ; that both truck drivers stated that they
could not make the left turn until Mrs. Cook had cleared
the intersection (Tr. 174, 175).
In their brief appellants agree that the driver of the
:first truck, Herschel Metcalf, stated that he did not remember motioning or signalling to Mrs. Cook to proceed
across the intersection (Tr. 174); they contend, however,
that 1Mrs. Cook and their witness, Elora Hutchings, both
testified that Metcalf had motioned or signalled to Mrs.
Cook to clear the intersection (Tr. 50, 60 Plaintiffs' Brief,
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~p. 2). It should be noted, however, that the court granted
~.this defendant's motion to strike the testimony of Elora

Hutchings to the effect that Metcalf signalled Mrs. Cook
t to pass in front of him as being a conclusion of the witness
!~ (Tr. 50, 51), and that the court pointed out that the testi~ mony of Mrs. Cook that he motioned her to cross the high~ way was merely her assumption (Tr. 60, 61). Mrs. Cook
:testified that Metcalf moved his arm twice in the manner
·which she indicated and that there was just a second or
: two between the first time he moved his arm and the sec~ ond time (Tr. 61, 62). It should also be pointed out that
: Mrs. Cook further testified that she knew the first tanker
~ could not make the turn unless she was out of the way;
~that the second tanker pulled up i~ back of the first
: tanker and there were then two tankers that were stopped
:on the highway and had to turn and go west (Tr. 61);
. that the first tanker ,remained stopped for a couple of min: utes and the second tanker pulled up and came to a com: plete stop behind it before she started to move at all
: (Tr. 64, 66) ; that she knew the driver of the tanker could
·. not. make the turn west while she remained stopped there
: and that she was aware of the fact that she was blocking
; the highway to that extent (Tr. 64, 65) ; that she ob. served the first driver of the tanker had the mechanical
signal out indicating that he intended to make a left turn
and that she proceeded in front of the first tanker over
into the east lane of the highway where she was hit (Tr.
62).
It should also be noted that Elora Hutchings, a witness called by the plaintiffs, testified that the first tanker
had been completely stopped in the intersection a minute
or two (Tr. 53, 56), and that Mrs. Cook was stopped for
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the stop sign two or three minutes before she started forward (Tr. 56); she further testified that after Herschel ;
Metcalf gave the signal which she described, Mrs. Cook .
hesitated about 30 seconds or so befpre she proceeded forward (Tr. 54, 57).
It is agreed that the plaintiff, James S. Devine, testi- .
fied that the two tankers had previously passed his auto- .
mobile and that as they approached the intersection of :
1500 South State Street they began to slow down and he :
assumed that they were either going to stop or most likely :
make a left turn and he likewise began to slow down (Tr. :
15). He further testified that there was 100 or 150 feet .
between the tankers as he was tra veiling along side them :
down the road; that as he went to go past the front of the ;
first truck he saw what he thought was a blur and stuck his :
foot on the brake and turned out to the side and came to
almost a complete stop before the impact with the Cook~~
car occurred (Tr. 16).
It is agreed that plaintiff, Mrs. James S. Devine, was .
riding in the front seat sitting sideways with her back :.
toward the right-hand front door, and that she was talking .
to her sister who was riding in the back seat (Tr. 68); that j
she testified that she noticed the two big oil tankers passing ~
them and that the tankers then began to slow down and .
their car was slowing down; that she was looking at the ·
tankers and noticed a blur and then felt their car brakes
being put on ( T r. 6 8) . On cross-examination she stated ,
that the brakes had been applied at the time she saw the ·.
blur and that she did not say anything to her husband
(Tr. 78, 79).
The plaintiff, Janet Gusinda, testified that she was ·
sitting in the middle of the back seat (Tr. 86); that she
1:
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the two tankers and that at first the tankers were
~passing them and then they started to gradually catch
t:up to the tankers and she thought she saw a wheel or some~thing on the other side of the road and thought the first
tanker went on and that the Cook car came off the side
~:road in front of the second truck (Tr. 85). She said
::that it was her impression that a car was coming across
rtthe highway but at the time the brakes were being applied
:~and she did not say anything to Dr. Devine about it (Tr.
tr:

5aw

~97,

98).

Herschel Metcalf, the driver of the first truck and
,::.trailer, testified that he was travelling in the left lane for
,\~northbound traffic; that he put the signal arm out to
~:~indicate a left turn and saw the Cook car stop for the
~~!:stop sign waiting for traffic to clear and that he did not
~:have any idea which way Mrs. Cook intended to go; that
::~it was impossible for him to make a left turn and he
stopped and waited there approximately a minute to a
}.~minute and a half for Mrs. Cook to go one way or the
mxother so he could proceed (Tr. 146, 147, 148, Exhibits D,
· E, 4, S and 6) .
The driver of the second truck and semi-trailer,
~'Philip Tumor, testified that he pulled up behind the truck
:.and trailer driven by Metcalf, came to a complete stop
~~and observed that Metcalf could not make the left turn
r;because of the Cook automobile. He testified that he
;~waited possibly a minute before the accident occurred
i(Tr. 182).
·;'
After the parties had rested the case was submitted
to the jury on written instructions and the jury returned
~:a verdict of no cause of action against all the plaintiffs and
:in favor of both defendants.
h
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STATEMENT OF POINTS
POINT I
THE INSTRUCTIONS DID NOT PREJUDICIALLY AC.
CENTUATE THE DUTY OF THE PLAINTIFFS OR MINIMIZE
THE DUTY OF THE DEFENDANTS AND NO EXCEPTION
WAS MADE TO THE INSTRUCTIONS ON THESE GROUNDS.
POINT II
IT WAS NOT ERROR FOR THE TRIAL COURT TO IN.
STRUCT THE JURY ON THE ISSUE OF CONTRIBUTORY
NEGLIGENCE OF THE PLAINTIFFS, MISS GUSINDA AND
MRS. DEVINE AND THE COURT'S INSTRUCTIONS IN THIS
REGARD WERE NOT ERRONEOUS OR PREJUDICIAL.
POINT III
ANY ERROR IN INSTRUCTING THE JURY COULD NOT
PREJUDICE PLAINTIFFS AS TO THE DEFENDANT, W. S.
HATCH CO., INC., AS THE MOTION OF THE DEFENDANT,
W. S. HATCH CO., INC., FOR A DIRECTED VERDICT SHOULD
HAVE BEEN GRANTED.

ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE INSTRUCTIONS DID NOT PREJUDICIALLY ACCENTUATE THE DUTY OF THE
PLAINTIFFS OR MINIMIZE THE DUTY OF THE
DEFENDANTS AND NO EXCEPTION WAS MADE
TO THE INSTRUCTIO·NS ON THESE GROUNDS.
Under Point I in their brief plaintiffs contend that
the trial court's instructions prejudicially accentuated the
duties of the plaintiffs and minimized the duty of the defendants. At the time of trial plaintiffs did not except to
the court's instructions on these grounds and they are
limited on this appeal to the exceptions taken at the time
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of trial. The entire exceptions taken by plaintiffs to
the court's instructions are as follows:
ucomes now the plaintiffs and except to the
Instructions given by the Court and more particularly to Instruction No. 4 and the third paragraph
thereof which injects into the lawsuit the issue of
contributory negligence on the part of Miss Gusinda
and Mrs. Devine, the passengers in the automobile,
since said issues were not clear1y raised by the
pleadings and were not supported by any factual
theory presented during the trial of the lawsuit.
cc:The plaintiffs except to the giving of Instruction No. 6 which likewise pertains to the duty
of guests in an automobile on the very same grounds
and reasons as stated in the exception immediately
pre.ceding.
uThe plaintiffs further except to Instruction
No. 9 on the grounds and for the reasons that the
last two sentences thereof single out one of the defendants, Helen Cook, and prescribes as to her a
limiting factor with reference to her duty which
definition, if given at all, should be given to all of
the parties generally who might have been charged
with negligence or contributory negligence, as was
requested by counsel for the plaintiffs prior to giving of said instruction." ( T r. 2 0 6)
We can find nothing in the exceptions which would
call the trial court's attention to plaintiffs claim that the
instructions accentuated the duty of the plaintiffs or
minimized the duty of the defendants.
In the recent case of Employers' Mutual Liability
Ins. Co. of Wisconsin v. Allen Oil Co., ________ U ta.h ________,
285 P. 2d 445, this court refused to consider an instruction
on its merits where the objection raised at the trial failed
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to point out with any degree of particularity wherein the
proposed instruction was not supported by the law. In
its opinion this court said and held:
uThe appellants' objection in the trial court to
instruction No. 19 was couched in general terms,
viz. <on the grounds and for the reasons that such
instruction is not supported by, and is contrary
to, the law and the evidence. That it is misleading, and can only serve to confuse the jury.' The
objection failed to comply with the requirements
of Rule 51, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, that cln
objecting to the giving of an instruction, a party
must state distinctly the matter to which he objects
and the grounds of his objection.' One of the purposes in requiring .counsel to make objections to
instructions in trial court is to bring to the attention of the court all claimed errors in the instructions and to give him an opportunity to correct them if he deems it proper. The objection
should be specific enough to give th~ trial court
notice of the very error in the instruction which
is complained of on appeal. But an objection that
an instruction is <not supported by, and is contrary to, the law' lacks specificness and does not
direct the court's attention to anything in particular. A proper objection to instruction No.
19 which would have called the court's attention
to the error raised on this appeal would have been
<That it does not correctly state the limits or extent of the respondents' legal liability.' No objection having been made which pointed out with any
degree of particularity wherein the instruction was
not supported by law, we will not here consider
the instruction on its merits."
If, in the face of the limited exceptions taken by
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plaintiffs they are now entitled to have the entire instructions reviewed, it should be kept in mind that the trial
involved three plaintiffs and two defendants, each occupying a particular legal status and having different rights
and duties. That the trial judge was fully aware of his
responsibilities in defining the numerous issues in the case
was apparent throughout the court's instructions and was
further illustrated by the court's comment to the jury
following his instructions and the arguments of counsel:
((Gentlemen of the jury, I think maybe I will
have something to say to you about these verdicts
in addition to what has been said to you. As has
been suggested there are virtually three· Ia wsui ts
being tried in one. Now I have had the Clerk fix
these verdicts in sets and they are in three sets here,
comprising four verdicts in each case, and it will
be necessary for you to return in each one of these
cases a verdict. I am not suggesting which ones
because you are the judges of that. But it will be
necessary for you to have three verdict returns in
these matters and I believe they are self-explanatory, not only by their wording but by what counsel has indicated to you, so you will not have any
trouble in reference to that."
The four possible verdicts submitted in each of the
three cases were as follows: ( 1) That the issues be found
in favor of plaintiff and against both defendants and that
damages be assessed, (2) that the issues be found in favor
of the plaintiff and against the defendant, Helen Cook,
and that damages be assessed, but that the issues be found
against the plaintiff and in favor of the defendent, W. S.
Hatch Co., Inc., no cause of action, ( 3) that the issues be
found in favor of plaintiff and against the defendant, W. S.
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Hatch Co., Inc., and that damages be assessed, but that
the issues be found against the plaintiff and in favor of the
defendant, Helen Cook, no cause of action, ( 4) that the
issues be found against the plaintiff and in favor of both
the defendants, no cause of action. This. made twelve
verdicts in all that were submitted to the jury. The fact
that the case took on this somewhat complicated aspect
resulted from the fact that plaintiffs chose to bring the
three lawsuits in one action and to attempt to fix liability
on two defendants. It may be that this was a situation
which would have been simplified by submitting special
interrogatories to the jury, but plaintiffs did not suggest
such a procedure but instead requested general instructions
and acquiesced in the cases being submitted on general instructions.
We submit that an examination of the entire instructions shows that the court very orderly and properly instructed the jury as follows: As to the issues of the case
(Instruction No. 1), the burden of proof as it applied to
both plaintiffs and defendants (Instruction No. 2), defined unegligence," ucontributory negligence," and ttproximate cause" (Instruction No. 3) , explained the effect of
contributory negligence on the part of Dr. Devine and
on the part of the guest passengers, and the effect of such
negligence if found to be the sole proximate cause and the
fact that any negligence on the part of Dr. Devine could
not be imputed to any of the passengers (Instruction No.
4), outlined in general terms the duty of drivers on the
highway and the right of way rule at intersections (Instruction No. 5) , outlined specifically the duty of the
guest passengers Mrs. Devine and Janet Gusinda (Instruction No. 6), outlined specifically the duty on the part of
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the driver of theW. S. Hatch Co., Inc. truck (Instruction
No. 7), outlined specifically the duty of Dr. Divine (Instruction No. 8), outlined specifically the duty of the
defendant, Helen Cook (Instruction No. 9), outlined the
law on unavoidable accidents (Instruction No. 10) , advised
the jury that if they found liability they should assess
damages (Instruction No. 11 ) , explained the manner in
which the damages should be assessed (Instruction No.
12), and finally gave the usual stock instructions containing definitions and rules regarding the conduct of the
jury (Instruction No. 13). The Plaintiffs' case was fairly
presented to the jury and the court in no way emphasized
the duty of the plaintiffs or minimized the duty of the
defendants.
To illustrate the emphasis given in the instructions
the plaintiffs complain that Instruction No. 7 is prejudicial
for the reason that it begins in the negative regarding the
duty of the truck driver, Herschel Metcalf, while other
instructions impose an affirmative duty on the plaintiffs.
The fact is that this instruction was requested by the defendant, Helen Cook, as Requested Instruction No. 12
in an effort to cast liability on this defendant and it was
objected to by this defendant at the time of trial as imposing a greater duty upon Herschel Metcalf than the
law requires. In requesting the instruction, counsel for
the co-defendant, Helen Cook, recognized the danger of
imposing too great a duty upon the truck driver, Herschel
Metcalf, and sought to shield the error of the instruction
by asserting ((that a driver of a vehicle upon a highway
has no duty to ascertain or advise other drivers whether
they may safely enter upon or pass over said highway."
If the instruction was repugnant to plaintiffs, it was par-
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ticularly so to this defendant as an over-statement of the
duty imposed upon Herschel Metcalf.

POINT II
IT WAS NOT ERROR FOR THE TRIAL COURT
TO INSTRUCT THE JURY ON THE ISSUE OF CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE O·F THE PLAINTIFFS,
MISS GUSINDA AND MRS. DEVINE, AND THE
COURT'S INSTRUCTIONS IN THIS REGARD
WERE NO·T ERRONEOUS OR PREJUDICIAL.
In their brief plaintiffs state that defendants did not
plead contributory negligence on the part of the guest
passengers until after the case had been tried and the
court had indicated its intention to instruct the jury on
contributory negligence. It is a fact that this defendant,
W. S. Hatch Co., Inc., did not plead contributory negligence on the part of the guest passengers until after the
evidence was in and the court had indica ted its intention
to instruct the jury regarding contributory negligence on
the part of the guest passengers, at which time this defendant moved to amend its complaint to conform to the
evidence and alleged contributory negligence on the part
of the guest passengers and the motion was granted (Tr.
188, 189).
The defendant, Helen Cook, however, pleaded contributory negligence on the part of the guest passengers
and tried the case on that theory and at the conclusion
of the evidence it was apparent to the trial court and to
defendants' counsel that there was sufficient evidence to
take the case to the jury on the question of contributory
negligence on the part of the guest passengers.
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In their brief the plaintiffs overlook certain facts
which create a decided conflict with plaintiffs' theory as
to how the accident occurred. The witness, Elora Hutchings, called and vouched for by the plaintiffs, testified
that Mrs. Cook was stopped at the stop sign two or three
minutes before she started forward (Tr. 57). Herschel
Metcalf testified that he was stopped for a minute to a
minute and a half (Tr. 148), and Mrs. Cook stated this
time to be a couple of minutes (Tr. 64). Philip Tumor,
the driver of the second truck, stated that he was stopped
possibly a minute before the Devine car passed him (Tr.
182). The plaintiff, Dr. Devine, testified that he was
travelling about thirty to thirty-five miles per hour (Tr.
40), that he had observed that the trucks had slowed down
most likely to make a left turn (Tr. 50), that as he slowed
down and went to go past the first truck he saw what he
thought was a blur and stuck his foot on the brake and
turned to the side, and that he came to almost a complete
stop when the impact occurred (Tr. 16). The police
officer called by the plaintiff testified that the Devine car
laid down 49 feet of skid marks before the point of impact and that the Cook car left no skid marks before the
1mpact.
Both of the guest passengers, Mrs. Devine and Janet
Gusinda, testified that they saw the two tankers and Mrs.
Devine testified that she noticed a blur and then felt the
car brakes being put on, but she did not say anything to
her husband (Tr. 68, 78, 79), while Janet Gusinda thought
she saw a wheel or something and thought the first tanker
went on and that the Cook car came off the side road in
'front of the second truck (Tr. 85). It was her impression
that a car was coming across the highway but at the time
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the brakes were being applied and she did not say anything
to Dr. Devine about it (Tr. 97, 98).
It thus appears that the jury might well have found
that the accident did not happen as claimed by plaintiffs
but that a situation existed for a period of time ranging
from one to two or three minutes during which time the
plaintiffs, as they approached the intersection, might well
have observed the condition and the guest passengers
would have had ample time to apprise their driver of the
situation after it appeared that he was not aware of the
danger and did not intend to yield the right of way to
Mrs. Cook. The fact that Mrs. Cook had the right of
way cannot be disputed under the evidence, and according to Dr. Devine's own testimony he was nearly stopped
at the time of impact. The jury would have certainly
been justified in finding that the slightest warning on the
part of the guest passengers would have apprised Dr.
Devine of the danger and enabled him to avoid the collision.
This court has on numerous occasions discussed the
degree of care which a guest in an automobile or other
vehicle must exercise for his own safety. In Atwood v.
Utah Light & Ry. Co., 44 Utah 366, 140 P. 137, this court
said:
It no doubt is the law, as contended by
appellant's counsel, that every occupant of a vehicle in which he is riding, must always exercise ordinary care for his own safety, and if, by the exercise
of such care, he could avoid injury to himself, but
fails to do so, he cannot recover, regardless of the
fact that he had no control or direction of the vehicle in which he was riding at the time of the acu •••
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cident and injury. ~~ ::- * Of course every one who
may be riding in a vehicle, whether as passenger,
invitee, or otherwise, must always exercise ordinary
care aJ?.d prudence to avoid injury to himself, and
to that end, in case of imminent danger, must leave
the vehicle in case such a course is practical and
necessary to avoid injurye Again, he may not sit
silently by and permit the driver of the vehicle to
encounter or enter into open danger without protest or remonstrance and take the chances, and, if
injured, seek to recover damages from the driver of
the vehicle or from the one whose negligence concurred with that of the driver's, or from both."
The rule as to when contributory negligence shall be
submitted to the jury and when it should be ruled on by
the court as a matter of law is set forth in Shortino v. Salt
Lake & U. R. Co., 50 Utah 476, 174 P. 860, as follows:.
((That the question of contributory negligence
on the part of the plaintiff, like that of the negligence of the defendant, is for the jury, where the
evidence and the inferences to be deduced therefrom are such that reasonable men may arrive at
different conclusions, has so often been decided by
this court that the proposition has, in effect, become elementary.
uln other words, if there is any substantial
doubt whether a plaintiff was or was not guilty
of contributory negligence, or whether, if negligent, such negligence was the proximate cause of
the injury, the court cannot determine the right
to recover as a matter of law, but must submit the
question of contributory negligence or of proximate cause, or both, to the jury as questions of
fact.
((Where, however, the facts are conceded, or
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there is no conflict in the evidence, and upon a consideration of all of the evidence, and the legitimate
inferences that may be deduced therefrom, but one
conclusion is permissible, then both questions are
questions of law, and must be determined as such
by the court."
In Montague v. Salt Lake & U. R. Co., 52 Utah 386,
174 P. 871, the court considered the duty of a guest riding in the same automobile involved in the accident in the
Shortino case. In holding that the question of contributory negligence on the part of the guest was properly submitted to the jury, the court said:
((The rule applicable here, which is adopted by
the Supreme Court of Minnesota in the case of
Cotton v. Willmar & S. F. Ry. Co., 99 Minn. 366,
109 N. W. 835, 8 L. R. A. (N. S.) 643, 116 Am.
St. Rep. 422, 9 Ann. Cas. 9 3 5, which case is cited
and followed in the Atwood Case, supra, is stated
thus:
((The rule which has met with general approval in the more recent cases makes the passenger
responsible only for his personal negligence, and
leaves it to the jury to determine whether, under
the circumstances he was justified in trusting his
safety to the care of the driver and not looking or
listening for himself. The negligence of the driver
is thus not imputed to the guest or passenger, buf
the circumstances may be such as to make it the
duty of the passenger to look and listen and attempt to control the driver for his own protection.
The passenger is thus held responsible for his own
negligence, but not for the negligence of the driver.
He must exercise due care and caution, and, if his
negligence contributes approximately to the accident, he cannot recover damages.'"
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In Cowan v. Salt Lake & U. R. Co., 56 Utah 94, 189
P. 599, suit was brought by another passenger in the
Shortino car. The court gives an exhaustive review of
cases from all states and concludes by approving the rules
laid down in the Atwood case and Montague case. In its
opinion the court said:
:l~

we can conceive of no reason why the
question of whether a passenger or an invitee riding in a vehicle was guilty o~ contributory negligence, in view of all the circumstances which would
bar a recovery, should not be left to the jury, unless that question is free from substantial doubt."
u ::·

::·

In Lawrence v. Denver and Rio Grande, 52 Utah 414,
174 P. 817, it was held that a guest, failing to see the train
where a view was apparently unobstructed and a warning signal was given, was guilty of contributory negligence
as a matter of law. In its decision this court said:
((Assuming for the sake of argument, but not
conceding, that plaintiff was merely the guest of
Bird, and was in no sense responsible for the manner in which Bird operated and managed the automobile while making the trip in question, it nevertheless was incumbent upon him to exercise
ordinary care and prudence/ by making diligent
use of his senses of sight and hearing, by looking
and listening for trains as the automobile approached the crossing, and to heed the warnings
and signals of the approach of the train, and to
suggest to Bird that they stop until the danger was
over, and to protest if that was not done * ::· ~· "
(Citing cases)
In objecting now to the trail court instructing on
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contributory negligence on the part of the guest passengers, and particularly as to the form of the instructions,
the plaintiffs are again confronted with their exceptions
to the court's instructions taken at the time of trial. The
most that can be made out of plaintiffs' exceptions is that
they ( I ) excepted to the third paragraph of Instruction
No. 4 which injects into the lawsuit the issue of contributory negligence on the part of Miss Gusinda and Mrs.
Devine since the issues were not clearly raised by the
pleadings and were not supported by any factual theory
presented during the trial; ( 2) excepted to Instruction
No. 6 on the very same grounds and reasons; and (3) excepted to Instruction No. 9 on the grounds that the last
two sentences single out one of the defendants and limit
her duty.
On this appeal for the first time the plaintiffs complain as to the form of Instruction No. 4 regarding the
duty of Dr. Devine and to the form of Instruction No. 6
regarding the duty of the guest passengers. We agree with
counsel for defendant, Helen Cook, who requested the
instructions, that the words complained of by plaintiffs
uin any degree" and uto any extent, however slight" do
not render the instructions so faulty as to be reversible
error under the recent case of Johnson v. Lewis, et al,
________ Utah ________ , 240 P. 2d 498. We strongly urge, however, that plaintiffs cannot be heard to complain as to
the form of the instruction at this time. The only grounds
for plaintiffs excepting to Instruction No. 4 and Instruction No. 6 were that the issue of contributory negligence
on the part of Miss Gusinda and Mrs. Devine, the passenge~s in the automobile, uwere not clearly raised by the
pleadings and were not supported by any factual theory
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presented during the trial of the lawsuit." (Tr. 206) As
has already been pointed out the defendant, Cook, pleaded
contributory negligence as an affirmative defense and
tried the case on that theory and at the conclusion of the
evidence the record shows that the court permitted the defendant, W. S. Hatch, Co., Inc. to amend its answer to
conform to the proof. It has also been demonstrated
that there was ample evidence to support the defendants'
theory of contributory negligence on the part of the guest
passengers. If plaintiffs had been concerned about the
form of the instructions on contributory negligence the
objections should have been taken at the time of trial.
We again call attention to the rule laid down by this
court in Employer's Mutual Liability Ins. Co. of Wisconsin
v. Allen Oil Co. (supra) that uNo objection having been
made which pointed out with any degree of particularity
wherein the instruction was not supported by law, we
will not here consider the instruction on its merits."
In Walkenhorst v. Kesler, 92 Utah, 312, 67 P 2d 654,
the court held that exceptions to instructions as a whole
cannot be s1:1stained if part of the instruction is good. In
its opinion the court said:
((The exceptions to the instructions were as
a whole. The exception did not even specify any
particular instruction. The six instructions were
grouped together. The (rule (is) too well established to be the subject of controversy that such
an exception cannot be sustained if any part of
the instruction is good.' H'ansen v. Oregon S. L.
R. Co., 55 Utah, 577, 188 P. 852, 854; McLaughlin
v. Chief Consol. Min. Co., 62 Utah, 53 2, 220 P.
726. In addition, the rule is that all parts of the
charge to the jury must· be construed together.
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When taken as a whole, if the charge is substantially correct and could not have misled the jury,
the verdict and judgment will not be disturbed.
This rule bears such unquestioned indorsement and
the cases supporting it are so numerous as to make
the citation of authorities unnecessary."
Again in Mehr v. Child, 90 Utah 348, 61 P 2d 624,
the court said and held:
uAppellants having confined their objections
to the whole instruction which is divisible into
integral parts, they are not entitled to prevail on
their assignment with respect to that instruction.
When an instruction is divisible into integral parts
and any one or more of the integral parts is not
open to objection, then, and in such case, an objection to the whole must fail. Among the numerous
cases in this jurisdiction which so hold are the following: Farnsworth v. Union Pac. Coal Co., 32
Utah, 112, 89 P. 74; Grow v. Utah Light & Ry.
Co., 37 Utah, 41, 106 P. 514; Rampton v. Cole,
52 Utah, 36, 172 P. 477; Hansen v. Oregon Short
LineR. Co., 55 Utah, 577, 188 P. 852; McLaughlin
v. Chief Consol. M. Co. 62 Utah, 532 220 P. 726."
The plaintiffs' exception to Instruction No. 9 is not
well taken. In that instruction the court outlined the
duty of the defendant, Helen Cook, as he had outlined
the duty of the defendant, W. S. Hatch Co., Inc. in Instruction No. 7, the duty of the plaintiff, Dr. Devine, in
Instruction No. 8 and the duty of Mrs. Devine and Janet
Gusinda in Instruction No. 6. In Earle v. Salt Lake &
Utah R. Corporation, ________ Utah ________ , 165 P. 2d, 877, the
court held that the defendant could not complain of an
instruction dealing with the duty imposed by law on the
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railroad at intersections as unduly emphasizing the railroad's duty because the plaintiff's duty was not also set
forth in such instruction where other instructions defined
the plaintiff's duties. In its opinion the court said:
u

::· ::·

* In Instruction No. 11, the court de-

fined the duty imposed by law on defendant at
intersections. Complaint is made that this unduly
emphasizes defendant's duty because plaintiff's
duty is not also set forth in that instruction. In
Instructions Nos. 17, 18 and 19 the court defined
the duty imposed on plaintiffs. It might have
been more concise to get the instructions dealing
with the duty of the respective parties closer together in the charge."
POINT III
ANY ERROR IN INSTRUCTING THE JURY
COULD NOT PREJUDICE THE PLAINTIFFS AS TO
THE DEFENDANT, W. S. HATCH CO., INC., AS
THE MOTION OF THE DEFENDANT, W. S.
HATCH CO., INC. FOR A DIRECTED VERDICT
SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED.
The only error claimed by the plaintiffs on this appeal is directed to the trial court's instructions. We submit that if the trial court erred in its instructions to the
jury, such error was not prejudicial to plaintiffs so far as
the defendant, W. S. Hatch Co., Inc. was concerned, as
the court should have granted such defendant's motion
for directed verdict at the close of the case. After all
parties had rested the defendant, W. S. Hatch Co., Inc.
moved the court as follows:
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ulf the court please, comes now the defendant,
W. S. Hatch Company, and moves for an instruction directing the jury to return a verdict in favor
of the defendant, W. S. Hatch Company, and
against the plaintiffs, and each of them, no cause
of action, on the ground and for the reason that
the plaintiffs first have failed to show by a preponderance of the evidence or by any evidence that
the defendant, W. S. Hatch Company, was guilty
of any actionable negligence which caused or contributed
to
.
. the cause of the accident and the resultIng InJUries.
uSecond, that it affirmatively appears that
James S. Devine, the driver of the car in which
plaintiffs were riding, was guilty of negligence and
that such negligence was the sole, proximate cause
of the accident and the resulting injuries sustained
by plaintiffs.
uThird, that it affirmatively appears from the
evidence that plaintiffs were each guilty of negligence which contributed to the cause of the accident in failing to keep a proper look out and in
failing to exercise ordinary care for their own
safety and that such acts of negligence constituted
contributory negligenc~ which would bar their
recovery." (Tr. 189-190)
The motion was taken under advisement and in view
of the jury's verdict, was not ruled upon. This defendant
earnestly contends that its motion for directed verdict
should have been granted, particularly on the ground that
the plaintiffs failed to show by a preponderance of the
evidence or by any of the evidence that the defendant,
W. S. Hatch Co., Inc., was guilty of any actionable negligence which caused or contributed to the cause of the
accident and the injuries. The only act or omission on

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

23
the part of W. S. Hatch Co., Inc. complained of by plaintiffs was that Herschel Metcalf, the driver of the first
truck, signalled Mrs. Cook in the manner described by
Mrs. Cook and Mrs. Hutchings. The plaintiffs contend
that this signal was a direction to Mrs. Cook to proceed
across the highway and that the way was clear for her
to do so. There is no rule of law that would permit such
a construction being placed on the evidence. Mr. Metcalf
testified that he had no idea which direction Mrs. Cook
intended to proceed. The evidence further showed that
he was not in a position to advise Mrs. Cook of the traffic
conditions nor did he attempt to do so. The very most
that could be said of a signal such as the one described
by Mrs. Cook and Mrs. Hutchings was that Metcalf was
advising her that he was yielding the right of way to her
and that so far as he was concerned she might proceed
and he would not hit her. That such a signal would be
limited to an assurance that Metcalf would yield the right
of way to Mrs. Cook was recognized in the case of Harris
v. Kansas City Public Service Commission (Supreme
Court of Kansas, 1931) 297 Pac. 718. In that case two
of defendant's street cars ware standing at the crossing
which plain tiff, a pedestrian, intended to use, the rear of
the front car and the front end of the following car both
encroaching on the pedestrian crosswalk. The plaintiff,
upon receiving a signal from the motorman of the rear
car, went between the two cars and was struck by another of defendant's cars proceeding in the opposite direction. The Supreme Court held as erroneous an instruction
given by the trial court judge which charged the jury
that plaintiff would not be guilty of contributory negligence if defendant's motorman signalled her to proceed
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over the crossing and she relied upon such signal under
the belief that there was no danger from an approaching
car, unless such a danger was obvious to a prudent person.
The court pointed out that the motorman's signal could
mean no more than an assurance that he would not start
his car and catch her between it and the car in front of it.
In its opinion the court said:
uThis instruction was based on the assumption
that the motorman who signaled plaintiff had some
duty to look out for pedestrians like plaintiff at
that street intersection. His duty was to operate
his own street car in a proper way so as not to injure pedestrians or other traffic having the same
right to use the street as the defendant corporation.
He had no duty to protect her against injury from
other street cars on parallel tracks. The defendant
company could not confer such authority and responsibility upon its motormen. ::· * * There was
no allegation that the motorman had authority to
direct street car traffic or authority to signal this
plaintiff that she could cross the street in safety.
It would have been a usurption of the police powers
of the city government itself for defendant to have
authorized its motorman to undertake that duty."
In further support of their motion for a directed
verdict the defendant, W. S. Hatch Co., Inc., contends
that the signal of Herschel Metcalf described by Mrs.
Cook and Mrs. Hutchings could in no way have been
the proximate cause of the collision between the Cook
automobile and the car driven by the plaintiff, Dr. Devine.
In Sumsion v. Streator-Smith, Inc., ________ Utah ________ , 132
P. 2d 68, the trial court granted defendants' motion for
non-suit and this court affirmed the ruling on the ground
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that plaintiff failed to show causal connection between
the negligent conduct complained of, namely the failure
to give an arm signal, and the injury to plaintiff. In its
opinion the court said:
uThe only alleged negligence was the failure to
signal and there was sufficient evidence to go to
the jury on the question of whether the defendant
signalled and whether the failure to signal was negligent conduct. But even so, the plaintiff still did
not make out a prima facie case for recovery in
negligence for there is no proof or evidence to show
that the failure to give the arm signal was the proximate cause of the injury. It is a fundamental
principle of the law of negligence that the person
complaining has the burden of showing causal
connection between the negligent conduct complaied of and the injury to the plaintiff. Bergman
v. Denver & R.G.R. Co., 53 Utah 213, 178 P 68;
Newton v. Oregon Short LineR. Co., 43 Utah 219,
13 4 P. 5 67. In· the instant case, there was no evidence to indicate that the tow truck driver failed
to look before pulling away from the curb. The
only negligent act complained of is the failure to
signal. The plaintiff must supply the links in the
chain of proximate cause which show that his failure to signal caused the collision. * ~· ~~ While
deductions may be based on probabilities, the evidence must do more than merely raise a conjecture
or show a probability. Where there are probabilities the other way equally or more potent the deductions are mere guesses and the jury should not
be permitted to speculate. The rule is well established in this jurisdiction that where (the proximate cause of the injury is left to conjecture, the
plaintiff must fail as a matter of law.' Tremelling
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v. Southern Pac. Co., 51 Utah 189, 170 P. 80, 84;
Tremelling v. Southern Pac. Co., 70 Utah 72, 257
P. 1066. Many cases are cited in support of this
proposition and the court quoted with approval
from 29 Cyc. 625 where it is stated: tThe evidence
must, however, do more than merely raise a conjecture or show a probability as to the cause of injury,
and no recovery can be had if the evidence leaves
it to conjecture which of two probable causes resulted in the injury, where defendant was liable
for only one of them.'
uThe trial court correctly held that the plaintiff failed to make out a prima facie case for recovery in negligence."
Certainly it cannot be successfully claimed that the
arm signal given under the circumstances described in
the evidence of this case was an effective cause of the
collision. The act of Mrs. Cook in hestitating thirty seconds and then proce·eding into the east lane of Highway
91 and the conduct of Dr. Devine in failing to yield the
right of way to her would either one be sufficient to
break any line of causation as a matter of law.
CONCLUSION
With regards to plaintiffs' case, the trial court fairly,
fully and very orderly instructed the jury on the issues
of the case, and in so doing the duty imposed on the
plaintiffs was not emphasized or accentuated, nor was
the duty imposed on defendants at all minimized. If it
was proper to instruct the jury on contributory negligence, it was necessary to keep that issue in mind throughout the instructions. To do otherwise would most cer-
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tainly have been error. Furthermore, the plaintiffs having
taken no exceptions to the instructions on these grounds
at the time of trial, cannot raise the objections for the first
time on appeal.
The evidence in the case required that the jury be
instructed regarding the question of contributory negligence of Mrs. Devine and Janet Gusinda. To have failed
to do so would have been error. The court's instructions
on contributory negligence were not prejudicial to plaintiffs' case, but if they were, the error now complained of
was not mentioned in the plaintiffs' exceptions to the
instructions and it cannot be considered on this appeal.
If this court were to find error in the instructions
the judgment should stand as to the defendant, W. S.
Hatch Co., Inc., as· its motion for directed verdict should
have been granted. The evidence in the case would have
required the trial court to direct a verdict for this defendant even if the jury had returned a verdict for plaintiffs.
The motion was good on the following grounds: That
there was no actionable negligence on the part of the defendant, W. S. Hatch Co., Inc., as the signal given by
Herschel Metcalf could only have indicated to Mrs. Cook
that as between the two he was yielding the right of way
to her; that such a signal could not have been a proximate
cause of the collision; and that Mrs. Cook by waiting
thirty seconds after the signal and then electing to proceed
and Dr. Devine in failing to yield the right of way to her,
completely broke any conceivable line of causation.
It is respectfully submitted that the plaintiffs received a fair trial at the hands of a conscientious and cap-
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able trial judge and jury, and that the judgment as to this
defendant, W. S. Hatch Co., Inc., should be affirmed.
Respectfully submitted,

RAY, QUINNEY & NEBEKER
THORNLEY K. SWAN
Attorneys for Defendant
and Respondent, W. S.
Hatch Co., Inc.

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

